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1. Linguistics: its development and representatives. 
1.1. The book under discussion provides a very good starting 
point for a consideration o f what is sometimes called 'the state o f 
the art'. I t gives a useful survey o f how a number o f eminent 
and representative linguists view language, and, at the same time, 
o f how they themselves use language when they discuss lan­
guage. Linguistic terminology and the language linguists use and 
the language linguists describe will therefore be the subject o f 
this article, and this is inherently determined by their definition 
of the field o f linguistics and its methodology. 
1.2. I n his presentation o f the development o f modern linguis­
tics Crystal (1971:167-243) distinguishes six 'ages' on the basis o f 
the shifting o f focus o f attention to specific 'areas o f concentra­
tion which were developed at a particular time dur ing this 
period* (1971:167). The six successive stages in the development 
of linguistics in his view are: phonetics, phonology, morphology, 
'surface' syntax, 'deep' syntax, semantics. These 'ages' can be dis­
cerned for the period from 1900 to 1970, and Crystal points out 
that by using such an interpretation inevitably certain issues wi l l 
have to be omitted. At the end o f his sketch o f major linguistic 
themes he speculates about a subsequent seventh age and claims 
that ' i t will be doubtless a distinctive contribution to semantic 
* I would like to thank J . Monaghan and B. Brömser for very helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this article. 
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analysis' (1971:244). His forecast is disproved by Parret's book 
and the development which has taken place since its conception 
and publication. T o my mind the dialogues clearly show the 
dawning of two further 'ages' which follow the six major themes 
distinguished by Crystal: the age o f pragmatics and the age of 
discourse analysis (or text linguistics, as it is also called). I believe 
that this shifting o f focus can be interpreted—in the same way as 
the previous development—as a re-discovery o f or a renewed 
interest in neglected areas and a counter-revolution against ear­
lier trends. I hope that some of this will become clear in the fol­
lowing. 
1.2. Discussing Language contains dialogues with ten linguists (cf. 
the subtitle)—five American, two French, one British, one Ger­
man, and one Russian (1-295) followed by a 'Synthesis' by the 
author-interviewer (297-299) and a summarizing dialogue with 
the French philosopher Jacques Bouveresse (301-403). The book 
further contains bio-bibliographical notes (407-411) on all the 
contributors, a comprehensive bibliography, and an index of 
names as well as a succinct three-page index o f subjects. The 
form of dialogues (preceded by informal conversations and a 
thorough preparation o f subject matter) was chosen in order to 
present the highly technical matter in an easily readable form. I t 
also facilitated the contrasting o f alternative theories by asking 
some linguists questions suggested by answers from others. Ex­
cept for the interview with Lamb and Saumjan the dialogues do 
not contain any formulas, diagrams, or other notational devices 
for formal representation. The aim of the book is defined by 
Parret ( V I I ) in the following way: 
T h e purpose was to present a substantial but easily readable survey of 
the ivroM chaTacieiVsiVc u e m V s Vn coYiievnporary Ymgtnsiies, a n a οϊ tVie 
methodological and epistemological problems raised by these trends. 
1.3. The choice o f the collaborators to be interviewed is not dis­
cussed explicitly by Parret. He mentions ( V I I ) that when he in­
vited the ten linguists 'the representativeness o f their work' and 
also 'the richness o f the philosophical problems connected with 
their linguistic theory' played a role. The collaboration o f the 
philosopher Bouveresse is not motivated at all. A n explanation 
would not have been inappropriate, especially since the latter 
more than once begins answering a question with formulations 
such as: ' it is really, I am afraid, a question for the language sci­
ence specialist and not for the philosopher' (338), or Ί am, of 
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course, totally incompetent to answer this question' (363). How-
ever, statements such as the last one must be considered as obvi-
ous understatements, in view of what Bouveresse then really has 
to say. His comments and judgments prove him to be not only a 
philosopher o f language but also a serious, competent, and well-
read linguist. His dialogue with Parret on such topics as linguis-
tic methodology, rationalism vs. empiricism, dichotomies, theories 
o f meaning, pragmatics and natural logic, and on the philosophy 
o f language turns out to be a very useful and well-balanced synop-
sis and evaluation o f the interviews with the ten linguists. As to 
the latter, one wonders whether they really represent the ideal 
choice for a complete and characteristic picture o f the most im-
portant trends in contemporary linguistics. The fact that five out 
o f the ten scholars are Americans and that two representatives o f 
Generative Semantics have been included may perhaps be jus-
tified by their enormous influence and their contribution to the 
amount o f linguistic publications.' Nevertheless, the omission o f 
such names as Fillmore, Hockett, Lyons, Nida, and Pike, which 
partly turn up in the course of the interviews and also in the bib-
liography, could perhaps have been justified one way or the 
other. O f course, there are limits imposed on the length o f such 
a book, and the line had to be drawn somewhere. On the whole, 
Parret's selection is certainly not a bad one, and it is balanced in 
that neither generative grammar on the whole is over-
represented, nor are there important unorthodox European ten-
dencies and developments which are completely neglected. I n 
sum, Discussing Language, in my opinion, must be regarded as a 
very valuable and welcome contribution to a better understand-
ing o f language and linguistics, which prevents its field from be-
coming too narrow and restricted and from ossifying in dogmatic 
orthodoxy. From this point of view the book is itself a document 
of the widening scope of research in understanding and explain-
ing language. 
2. Definitions of language, language functions and linguistics. 
2.1. I t would seem obvious that when linguists talk about language, 
they must draw the distinction between object-language and 
metalanguage. Strangely enough, however, this distinction is never 
referred to in these terms in all the dialogues with the ten linguists, 
and is only mentioned once in the book (368) by the philosopher 
Bouveresse. As a result of this, neither term appears in the index. 
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This lack is perhaps explained by the fact that the interviews took 
place in 1972. In my opinion, the failure to draw the distinction 
between object-language and metalanguage is responsible for a 
considerable amount o f confusion which has arisen especially wi thin 
the framework of early Generative Semantics. That linguistic ter-
minology is a metalanguage, not on the same level as the object-
language which is analyzed, has often been disregarded. O n the 
other hand, since it is a language, it can and should be analyzed itself 
with the help o f linguistic methods (cf. Lipka, 1975: 200, 202, 205f, 
212f for an analysis o f presupposition, transformational, lexicalization, 
lexical insertion, discovery procedures). The symbolization o f meta-
linguistic terms and theoretical constructs by means o f some nota-
tion is, in my opinion, on the next higher level o f abstraction, and 
could therefore be called meta-metalanguage. This characterization 
would apply, for example, to the use o f some artificial language or 
logical system for the analysis and representation o f natural lan-
guages. Such a three-level approach is in agreement with what 
Hartmann has to say on this subject in the book (138): 1 
One should distinguish the object language from the descnptive language and 
the theoretical language. T h e descriptive language would be there to refer to 
the object language; the theoretical language would formulate what has 
shown up in the relation between descriptive language and object language 
or what has been explained or theoretically recognized. 
In my interpretation Saumjan leaves out the middle level when he 
makes a two-way distinction between genotype language and phenotype 
language (279): 
Because to study natural languages it seems necessary to construct an ideal 
language, i.e. artificial symbolic language which simulates the universal 
properties of natural language. I call this ideal language the genotype 
language. T h e genotype language may be considered the semiotic basis of 
natural languages which I call phenotxpe language*. 
Bouveresse also makes a two-term separation and stresses the 
different properties o f the two languages, leaving aside the degree 
of abstraction (368): 
When he formulates the interpretation rules of an object language in a 
semantic metalanguage, the logician chooses the dictionary arbitrarily; in the 
case of a natural language, however, the dictionary is explicitly given, in part, 
and, for another part, it is implicit in the usage. The rules do not play the 
same role depending on whether a formal system or an ordinary language is 
1. Unless stated otherwise the italics in the quotations are those in the original. 
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at stake: they are definitional in the first c;»se, descriptive and explanatory in 
the second. 
Chafe draws attention to still another aspect o f the difference 
between logic, used as a metalanguage, and the object-language— 
with which linguists, in my opinion, should be primarily 
concerned—namely (11): 
Logic is just another kind of language; it is a language that leaves out a lot 
and therefore allows you to do things that you could not do otherwise. 
2.2. Let us now look at the way the word language is used in the 
book by the ten representative linguists. There are very few explicit 
remarks on this usage, and the most pertinent ones are made by the 
philosopher Bouveresse. O f course, the usage o f the term for 
denoting an extra-linguistic referent—in other words, its referential 
function—is very closely connected with the definitions o f language 
given by the ten linguists, to which we will come presently. The first 
explicit comment is made by Chafe (18): 
O f course it all depends on how you use the word language. You can use it to 
include gesture systems or traffic light systems, but it is probably best to 
restrict it to what we usually mean by language. T h e other systems are clearly 
much more primitive than language—the remarkable thing about language 
is its tremendous complexity and variety. 
That the word language may be used in a very wide sense is 
illustrated by a remark in the dialogue with Greimas (72): 
Musical language for example can be studied on the basis of a score, but also 
on the basis of an analysis of the gestures of the pianist's hands, or also as a 
perceptive phenomenon. 
Halliday, on the other hand, stresses the fact, that the term should 
be restricted to vocalized language, and that gesture, although it 
plays an important role, is a 'paralinguistic system* (84). 
There is, today, a characteristic and disastrous trend towards applying 
'language' or 'logic' to almost everything, to everything that somehow 
resembles a system of signs. 
This remark by the philosopher Bouveresse (308) is certainly very 
true. Furthermore, it is also justified with reference to the ten other 
contributors to the book. Some of them, it is true, have a rather 
narrow conception of language. Others, however, give a very 
comprehensive definition o f their subject. Bouveresse sums up the 
differences in a very convincing way (302f): 
What the linguists do not agree upon is, first of all, the definition itself of 
what they are supposed to study: language. . . . one could say, on the one 
hand, that they disagree totally, but, on the other hand, that there is no real 
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disagreement because, when they talk about language, they talk principally 
about the same empirical entity, but not about the same scientific object. 
2.3. I propose to interpret the nominalization the language of 
linguists in two ways: firstly, as denoting the scientific object with 
which the ten linguists are concerned; secondly, as the language 
linguists use (see 3.). The linguists' definitions o f the language they 
study have some features in common—which allows the setting up 
o f certain groups—but there are also important differences between 
the definitions o f some linguists o f very different convictions. One 
might employ the technique of establishing bundles of features in 
order to capture the cross-classification o f the characteristics of 
language 2. The view that language is an instrument o f communica-
tion is the common denominator that is probably not denied by 
anyone, although it is neglected to some extent by certain con-
tributors. The classical structuralist position can best be seen in the 
following statement by Martinet (234): 
I start from a definition of language as an instrument of communication, 
with a double articulation and a vocal nature. . . . I shall call language 
whatever fits that definition and refuse to call language an object that does 
not. 
For Greimas, who takes up one of the three criteria, this definition is 
not sufficient since it leaves out an important aspect o f natural 
language (73): 
However, it is not the 'double articulation' that constitutes alone the 
specificity of natural language. From the syntactic point of view it is 
necessary to add another characteristic that is at least as important: the 
capacity of splitting, through procedures of shifting, the utterance from the 
utterance act. 
The criterion o f the basically vocal nature o f language—whose 
importance must be understood as determined by the specific 
situation of structural linguistics in America analysing dying spoken 
languages—is also to be found in Halliday's position (84). However, 
Halliday furthermore stresses the importance o f paralinguistic sys-
tems, the functional and social aspects oflanguage, and the view that 
language is stratified (85f): 
I adopt the general perspective on the linguistic system you find in 
Hjelmslev, in the Prague school, with Firth in the London school, with Lamb, 
2. Cf. the procedures of semantic analysis, including the use of tree diagrams and feature 
matrices for the representation of the results, that are employed in Lipka (1979) to the usage of 
terms such as lexical field, semantic field, wordfield, etc. by a variety of linguists. 
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and to a certain extent with Pike—language as a basically tristratal system: 
semantics, grammar, phonology. 
Lamb himself explains his theory o f stratificational linguistics in 
great detail in his dialogue with Parret. He furthermore stresses the 
point that in his view language is a network o f relationships and not 
of entities (196). 
Besides considering the spoken form of natural langauge as the key 
system, which is seen as stratified, Halliday points out that language 
is not simply a system, but a system in use (99): 
I think that the use of language can be defined in precisely these terms, 
namely as the actualization of a potential. Now we want to understand 
language in use. 
This stress on the functioning o f language is fully compatible with 
another extension o f the scope of linguistics as it is found in the 
following remarks by Hartmann (123): 
Language presents itself in a text. Every linguistic function observed or 
ascribed to elementary units until this time—words, sentences, parts of 
words, etc.—only appears to be clear within a normal language event, i.e. 
when linguistic expressions appear in the form of a text. 
Both tendencies, the functional approach and the widening o f the 
field beyond the sentence, must, in my opinion, be explained as a 
rehabilitation and rediscovery of areas which were particularly 
neglected by generative grammar. This is also the intepretation o f 
the philosopher, when he looks at the linguistic trends which become 
apparent in the dialogues (351): 
What surprised me in the dialogues I read is exactly the vigorous reaction 
today in favor of a theory of language use. It seems that many people are now 
tired of studying language as a being or entity, if I may say so, and that they 
are tempted to study language more as a doing, as an action and behavior. In 
a way, the interest given to language as a system and as a structure, which has 
been dominant since Saussure and which generative grammar has carried to 
an extreme, is visibly decreasing. Some linguists and language philosophers 
realize that one has not really reached an understanding of the essence of 
language as long as it is not understood how language is used by those who 
possess it. 
He also claims (302f) that Chomsky considers the communicative 
function o f language as accidental and regards language primarily 
as an infinite potential to produce sentences' [sic!] 3 . A clear defini-
3. In fact—to be more precise than Bouveresse—this is Chomsky's standard definition of 
grammar, not of language. 
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tion of language does not emerge in the interview with Chomsky. He 
only remarks, at one point, with regard to the distinction between 
language and dialect, that 'the characterization o f a "language" as a 
dialect with an army and a navy is not far from the t ru th ' 4 . Far more 
revealing, in my opinion, is the observation Bouveresse (328) makes 
about Chomsky's scientific object, language: 
The difficulty comes from the fact that Chomsky uses two very different 
languages simultaneously. He suggests on one side that the prescriptions of 
the grammar are simply registered in mechanisms, probably neurophysiologi-
cal mechanisms, of which the functioning may naturally be partly accom-
panied by conscience; on the other hand he presents them as systems of rules 
of which we have a certain form of'knowledge'. 
2.4. We have seen how various linguists agree on some characteris-
tics o f language, but differ in their definitions in the way these 
features are taken together and emphasized. I n order to get a 
complete picture let us now briefly look at what the ten linguists have 
to say about the function o f language. The reference o f this term is 
by no means obvious, as Greimas points out (71): 
I would first like to stress the polysemy of the term function—it has at least 
three distinct meanings. First its utilitarian, instrumental sense; to the 
question 'what is language used for?' the answer is obviously, to communi-
cate, to express. 
Greimas further distinguishes an organicists' sense and a 
logico-mathematical sense of the term. As regards the instrumental 
sense, most linguists agree that language has a variety o f functions, 
of which, however, communication is the most important one. Chafe 
(17) includes all these functions 'in the word communication. 
Chomsky (5 I f ) objects to the assigment of a central purpose to 
language and to the opposition o f communicative function and the 
function of language for the expression o f thought. He insists, 
however, on the importance oi the \atter {bV) which ieads 
Bouveresse (303) to interpreting his position as regarding the 
communicative function o f language as accidental. For Martinet, on 
the other hand, language is fundamentally an instrument o f com-
munication, as we have seen already. 
Halliday, who in his published work uses the term function in a 
variety o f ways, which is sometimes confusing, makes the following 
explicit statement in the book under discussion (93): 
4. This definition goes back to Robert Hall, as is mentioned in the dialogue with McCawley (264). 
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I would like to make a distinction between junction and use, just as you 
suggest, and somewhat in these terms. As far as the adult language is 
concerned, it is possible to talk about the 'uses' of language, by which I would 
understand simply the selection of options within the linguistic system in the 
context of" actual situation types: 'use' in its informal everyday sense. . . . 
now I would distinguish that from function because the whole of the adult 
language system is organized around a small number of functional compo-
nents. 
For child language Halliday (11 Of) recognizes six distinct functions: 
the instrumental, the regulatory, the interactional, the personal, the 
heuristic, and the imaginative function. For adult language Halliday 
distinguishes three meta-functions or macro-functions, also sometimes 
called components: the ideational, the interpersonal, and the textual 
function. The ideational function is split into the sub-components o f 
experiential and logical function. I n the dialogue with Parret (95), 
Halliday relates his distinctions to Bühler 's representational, cona-
tive, and expressive functions. For several contributors to the book, 
such as Lakoff (177), Martinet (235f) and Saumjan (293) language 
combines the two functions o f communication and expression. For 
McCawley (253), finally, 
Language can be used as an all purpose instrument, to express meanings 
appropriate to essentially any situation, to convey essentially any information 
that one might want to convey. A language can accommodate itself to all 
possible matters, to any possible intention of the speaker. 
2.5 The field o f linguistics is obviously determined by the defini-
tion o f language and the functions ascribed to it by the linguists. As 
Bouveresse points out (306) there are some linguists, such as 
Chomsky, who attribute a central position to the ideational function 
o f language, and are therefore psycho-linguistically oriented, while 
others consider the interpersonal function as most important, and 
consequently subscribe to a socio-linguistic orientation o f the field. 
The most outstanding representative o f the latter view is Halliday, as 
is amply documented in his dialogue with Parret. The restriction to 
natural languages leads Greimas to the definition o f the field o f 
linguistics as a subpart o f semiotics (78): 
I f linguistics, instead of being concerned as it is now with natural languages, 
proclaimed that its object of knowledge is all possible languages, then it could 
be said that linguistics as a language talking about all other languages is the 
ultimate scientific object. Since that is not the case, it is the general semiotics, 
the 'semiology' announced by Saussure, which contains linguistics as a 
particular semiotics, that will appear the goal of the general scientific project. 
Lakoff, on the other hand, defines the field in an all-embracing way, 
that is parallel to the comprehensive definition o f language function 
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given by McCawley earlier, namely as (151): 
I take linguistics to be the study of natural language in all of its manifesta-
tions. This is a broad conception of the field, and I think it is an appropri-
ately broad one. It includes not just syntax-semantics, phonetics-phonology, 
historical linguistics, anthropological linguistics, etc. which form the core of 
most academic programs in this country, but also the role of language in 
social interaction, in literature, in ritual, and in propaganda, and as well the 
study of the relationship between language and thought, speech production 
and perception, linguistic disorders, etc. 
This surprising statement by Lakoff shows, especially i f compared to 
pronouncements about the aim and scope o f linguistics in early 
generative grammar, how much the orientation o f so-called genera-
tive linguists has changed within the last twenty years. I t has serious 
consequences for the methodology o f linguistics, especially as re-
gards the status and function o f formalization which wil l be dis-
cussed later. I n my opinion, this shifting o f point o f view has 
resulted in a trend away from rigorous mathematical formalization 
and symbolization to a preference o f such collocations as fuzzy logic, 
fuzzy grammar, and sloppy identity as used in the language o f linguists. 
Instead o f hard and fast rules, based on yes/no-decisions, what 
Bolinger (1961) once called the 'all-or-none' as opposed to the 
'more-or-less', tendencies and overlaps have been re-discovered by 
linguists. I n my opinion, the way for the recognition o f gradience 
has been paved by such terms as nouny, squish, introduced by Ross, 
and the 'brand-name' natural logic, coined by Lakoff himself 5. I n this 
respect the language o f linguists is significant and indicative o f their 
changing attitudes towards their own field o f research. 
3. The language linguists use: formalization, terminology, and hypostatiza-
tion. 
3.1. As we have seen already, the expression the language of linguists 
may be used to refer to their scientific object. On the other hand, the 
nominalization may also be interpreted as denoting the language 
linguists use. However, the referent of the nominalization inter-
preted in this manner is not a unified object. A t least two large areas, 
with further subdivision may be distinguished: the linguist's object 
language and his terminology (i.e. his metalanguage) on the one 
hand, and his notational system, his symbolization, his formalization 
(i.e. his meta-metalanguage) on the other hand. We will discuss both 
5. Cf. Ross (1972). Bouveresse (394) states that 'the expression "natural logic" is somewhat 
misleading since it suggests that the other logic is not natural and 'a rather gratuitous 
invention of the logician'. 
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uses o f language by linguists in turn , beginning with the problems of 
formalization and its function. Before we come to this point let me 
briefly illustrate my view o f the former area. Bouveresse mentions 
(350) that terms such as psycholinguistic or sociolinguistic 'are now 
being used by a certain number o f linguists with a clearly pejorative 
connotation'. Mentalism was the deadly sin o f structural linguistics, 
and being accused of it in those days was as bad as being called a 
taxonomic linguist in the hey-day o f transformational-generative 
grammar. Such uses o f language by linguists, with implicit or explicit 
negative meaning, can be compared to the more or less conscious 
uses o f terminological labels, which conceal differences in denota-
tion, i.e. have non-identical extralinguistic referents. A particularly 
striking example in the book is the use o f tree diagram by Saumjan 
(283) for the following 'scheme': 
p q 
Apq 
3.2. Let us now consider the problem o f formalization and its 
function. I n her review o f a collection o f papers edited by Bierwisch 
and Heidolph under the title Progress in Linguutics Robin Lakoff 
(1973:696) gives a number o f reasons why the volume is worth 
reading, and concludes: 
Finally, because it provides a number of terrible examples of the dire results 
of over-dependence on formalism, and is thus an instructional device for the 
weaning of the young from excessive use of formalism for its own sake. 
I believe that it is this hypertrophic development o f formalization 
which has provoked a counter-reaction. This reaction is responsible, 
in my view, for the rise and fall o f the term presupposition (cf. Lipka, 
1975:201), the growing insistence on the fuzzy nature o f language, 
and, in general, the abandonment of attempts at formalization in 
many recent linguistic publications. This development may be 
illustrated, for example, by Fillmore's published work since 1965. 
His case is only a particularly striking example. 
3.2.1. I do not want to argue that formalization in itself is a bad 
thing. Even those linguists who refrain from formalizing the results 
o f their research today will probably subscribe in principle to the 
characterization of the function o f formalization which Chomsky 
(1957:5) gave in the preface to Syntactic Structures: 
Precisely constructed models for linguistic structure can play an important 
role, both negative and positive, in the process of discovery itself. By pushing 
a precise but inadequate formulation to an unacceptable conclusion, we can 
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often expose the exact source of this inadequacy and, consequently, gain a 
deeper understanding of the linguistic data. More positively, a formalized 
theory may automatically provide solutions for many problems other than 
those for which it was explicitly designed. 
I t must, however, be pointed out that the basis o f formalization is not 
questioned in Syntactic Structures. This is true as well for the employ-
ment o f traditional categories of word-class, such as Noun, Verb, 
Adjective, the morphologically-based category Prepositional Phrase, 
and the classical binary cut o f the sentence, into NP and VP which is 
equivalent to the Subject/Predicate distinction. A verb-central ap-
proach, such as dependency theory or case grammar, no matter how 
it is formalized, is much more revolutionary than Chomsky's 'revo-
lution' in 1957. The next revolution, so-called Generative 
Semantics6—where categories o f symbolic logic were introduced for 
the formalization o f semantic representations, that were believed to 
be o f the same formal nature as syntactic representations (for 
example in McCawley, 1970:168-172)—did not proceed in exactly 
the same fashion. However, explicit procedures for assigning sym-
bols to concrete elements o f language were also not given. Further-
more, instead o f syntactic categories, many syntactic transformations 
were taken for granted, and carried over in unanalysed form. This, I 
believe, was the result o f the hypostatization o f linguistic constructs 
(see 3.4.). I t is significant, in my view, that rigorous explicit formali-
zations o f such transformational processes are to be found more and 
more rarely. 
3.2.2. In his dialogue with Parret, Halliday (84) gives credit to 
Chomsky for having shown for the first time, that natural language 
can be 'brought within the scope of formalization', however, at the 
cost o f a 'very high degree o f idealization'. Martinet (242) states that 
he mav have been 'too tempted to resist formalization, perhaps as a 
reaction against what I consider to be excesses'. McCawley (262) 
gives the following very appropriate comment on the advantages 
and disadvantages o f formalization: 
The biggest advantage to formalization is that it forces one to be explicit . . . 
the principle disadvantage to formalization is that one very often doesn't 
have means of formalization at his disposal which are really appropriate for 
what he wants to say . . . A lot of work in transformational grammar, 
particularly in the early sixties, had very little point, due to the face that so 
6. For a criticism of some central assumptions of Generative Semantics cf. Brame (1976); for an 
evaluation of its status as a coherent, alternative theory cf. O'Donnell (1974). 
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much attention was devoted to questions of applying an existing formalism, 
without regard for substantive questions about language and its structure. A 
formalism is valuable only if one at every step takes acntical attitude towards 
the formalism and is prepared to reject or modify the formalism whenever it 
ceases to be servant and becomes master. 
I t is refreshing to read such a statement published in 1974, but one 
wonders i f McCawley's advice has really been taken heed o f by the 
many linguists who have followed the fashion o f applying Mon-
tague's theory (cf. for example Hausser, 1976). 
3.3. Let us now take up another language linguists use, namely 
their terminology. The problems of terminology wil l be discussed in 
two sections: first some explicit remarks about it wil l be considered, 
and, secondly, some more crucial terms and their divergent use by 
the linguists wil l be treated in greater detail. 
3.3.1. There are some passages in Discussing Language where the 
linguists explicitly refer to the possible ambiguity o f their metalan-
guage. Thus Chomsky (43) mentions the 'systematic ambiguity' o f 
grammar, which may denote either the system o f rules internalized by 
the speaker-hearer, his competence, or the system o f rules as 
constructed by the linguist, his theory o f the speaker-hearer's 
competence. He further (46) draws attention to the different uses o f 
presupposition, which may denote the presuppositions o f a sentence, 
or those o f a speaker. Halliday (94) mentions that structure 'can be 
used in a sense which is more or less synonymous with "system" ', 
and points out that he has avoided using the term in that sense. 
Furthermore, there are remarks by Lakoff (173) and Lamb (216) on 
generative and by McCawley (271) on presupposition to which we will 
re turn presently. Finally, as regards performance, the philosopher 
Bouveresse (349) states that the notion 
has actually often been used to cover almost indistinctly all the untheorizable 
aspects of language mastery and use. Under these conditions it is, as you say, 
rather strange to talk about a 'theory' of performance 
and that Halliday and McCawley explicitly refer to this prob-
lematical usage in their dialogues with Parret. 
3.3.2. I n the following, some more central lexical items o f the 
linguists' language will be considered in detail. For easier reference 
the analysis will be in alphabetical order. Deep structure is perhaps one 
o f the most influential terms in recent linguistics. I t must be stressed, 
however, that a variety o f heterogeneous extralinguistic referents 
have been denoted by the term. Chomsky, who took over Hockett's 
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distinction between surface grammar and deep grammar, claims that the 
syntactic component o f a grammar must assign both a surface 
structure and a deep structure to each sentence. I n the Standard 
Theory the semantic interpretation o f the sentence is fully deter-
mined by the deep structure; in the Extended Standard Theory, the 
surface structure also plays a role. Besides denoting a specific 
'deeper' representation o f a sentence, deep structure is also used for 
referring to a specific level o f the theory. The existence or non-
existence o f such a level o f deep structure is a controversial issue 
between Chomsky and the Generative Semanticists, to which 
Chomsky (38) refers in Discussing Language. Wi th regard to the 
changing usage o f deep structure—in the former sense—we can 
characterize the development in general terms in the following way: 
deep structures have become more abstract, more semantic, and 
more logical in Generative Semantics. I n the book under discussion 
(152), Lakoff claims—with some justification—that in his Extended 
Standard Theory Chomsky 'created a new and very different notion 
o f deep structure' which is very close to surface structure, since it 
precedes transformations and contains all lexical items. Lamb points 
out (204) that in stratificational grammar 'the analogy is going in the 
opposite direction' and the level o f deep structure corresponds to 'a 
higher stratum'. I f we leave questions o f directionality out o f 
consideration, it is significant that McCawley (254) notes that deep 
may not only mean removed from the surface, but also close to 
semantic structure, and that deep structures have become 'progres-
sively deeper . . . unti l the distance between deep structure and 
semantic structure approached zero'. He further remarks (256f) that 
underlying structure might be identified with 'certain characteristics o f 
"deep structure", as that term was used in Chomsky's Aspects', 
although underlying would refer to all o f the intermediate stages o f 
derivation, including 'the deepest end o f derivations' which is the 
semantic structure. Deep structure in the former sense, i.e. for a 
particular representation o f a concrete sentence, may also be used 
synonymously with underlying structure. Such a proposal is made in 
Haas (1973:283), where it is argued—I believe correctly—that a 
choice between several equally informative deep structures is both 
arbitrary and undesirable, and the following definition is given: 
The term 'deep structure', as I shall be using it, is then to be taken as 
referring indifferently to any kind of underlying structure that may be 
proposed when a sentence or construction is to be assigned to transforma-
tionally related structures, one 'deeper' or semantically more instructive than 
the other. 
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That there is no single deep structure—neither as a level, nor as 'the 
correct' representation o f a sentence—existing independently o f 
theoretical assumptions, has often not been recognized, even by 
linguists. In my opinion this failure is a result o f hypostatization, 
induced by the existential presupposition o f such a term. A striking 
example of this phenomenon is found in the book (240) in Mar-
tinet's remark on deep structure: 
It is a fascinating term that entrances people. Nobody actually knows what deep 
structure is, as is clearly demonstrated by the divergence between the 
Chomskyan and Fillmorean points of view: Chomsky considering the subject 
as an essential element of deep structure, whereas Fillmore denies its 
existence [My emphasis, L.L.] . 
Let us now turn to the use o f generative by linguists. Two extreme 
views can be found in the book. The first one, derived from the 
technical term generate, as used in mathematics and introduced to 
linguistics by Chomsky, is referred to by Lamb (211) in the context 
o f a discussion o f idioms and their delimitation: 
It is very important for psychological reality to recognize the fuzziness of this 
boundary. And therefore we don't want such a thing as a strictly generative 
grammar, since, as Hockett pointed out, generative grammar presupposes a 
sharp boundary between the grammatical and the ungrammatical. 
Since the fuzziness of natural languages has been re-discovered, in 
my opinion, by the so-called Generative Semanticists they could not 
go on any longer to use generative in this sense. Consequently, Lakoff 
( I73f ) defines the meaning o f the term in both the collocation 
generative grammar and generative semantics as being simply 'complete 
and precise'. This second position with regard to the use of generative 
shows a rather strange semantic development o f the term. Some 
explanation is to be found in the following remark by Lakoff (174) 
on the collocation generative semantics which 
is not a very accurate descriptive term for what we are doing. When I first 
used the term back in 1963, it was an amalgam of'generative grammar' and 
'interpretative semantics'. 
McCawley (256) is more outspoken about it , admitting that generative 
semantics is 'misleading', and that he does not have a name 'that I am 
happy with for what I am doing', since he considers the proposed 
alternative term semantax as 'barbaric'. He further rejects the use o f 
generative in the former, classical sense (249): 
I maintain that it makes no sense to speak of the grammaticality or 
ungrammatically of strings of words; what I am doing is thus not generative 
grammar in Chomsky's sense. 
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The term presupposition has for some time been a vogue-word in 
linguistics and has generated (in the non-technical sense) a flood o f 
literature. Its use in philosophy and linguistics has been the subject 
o f many articles, books, and readers, and it is therefore completely 
impossible, to give an appropriate account here. Some issues will 
nevertheless be taken up. The first one is that it has been noticed 
and explicitly mentioned that the use o f the term is confusing. This 
state o f affairs has been deplored by philosophers and linguists alike. 
Secondly, it has been increasingly recognized that the term does not 
denote a single phenomenon, and that therefore several kinds o f 
presupposition must be distinguished. The failure to do so at an earlier 
stage is, in my opinion, a result o f hypostatization. My last point is 
that the problems connected with this term may be partly solved by 
applying linguistic methods to linguistic terminology. 
As mentioned earlier, Chomsky (47) draws attention to the fact that 
one may speak o f presuppositions of a sentence as well as o f presupposi-
tions of the speaker. This is related to the distinction between logical 
and pragmatic presuppositions to which Lakoff (164) and McCawley 
(271) refer in the book. McCawley furthermore admits that 
I and other generative semanticists are guilty of using the term 'presupposi-
tion' in a variety of senses and not always distinguishing between those 
senses. 
He considers (273) the existence presupposition as a subclass o f logical 
presuppositions. Parret and Bouveresse (382-386) state that there is 
'almost total confusion' with regard to the use o f presupposition and 
that logical, pragmatic, lexical, sentential, existential, and textual 
presuppositions could be distinguished. This long list only implicitly 
contains another use o f the term, as it is to be found in Fillmore's 
and McCawley's writings, namely as a successor to the theoretical 
construct of selection restriction. Bouveresse also points out (383) that 
Ducrot proposes to treat presupposition 'as a particular speech act'. 
The failure to draw the necessary distinctions explicitly and openly 
is, in my opinion, due to the phenomenon o f hypostatization, caused 
by the existence o f the single lexical item presupposition (cf. 3.4.). Part 
o f the ambiguity, or rather polysemy, o f the complex lexical item 
presupposition can be explained with the help o f linguistic methods, as 
I tried to show in Lipka (1975:200). Using the methods o f word-
formation developed by Hans Marchand, presupposition can be 
synchronically analysed as a suffixal derivative in -ition, and related 
to an underlying sentence containing the two-place predicate presup-
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pose1. The collocation existential presupposition can thus be derived 
from an underlying sentence containing the noun existence in 
object-position; the nominalization presupposition of a sentence (equiva-
lent to sentential presupposition) as well as the nominalization presuppos-
ition of the speaker from a sentence with the noun (sentence, speaker) in 
subject-position. 
We just saw that there is not a single extralinguistic referent denoted 
by the term presupposition. The same is basically true for other labels 
o f the metalanguage. Let us briefly look at the use o f semantics to 
further illustrate this point. I n one o f his questions addressed to 
Hartmann, Parret (129) states: 
There are many kinds of semantics: philosophical semantics, logical and 
linguistic ones. 
These distinctions are further taken up in the dialogue with 
Bouveresse (362, 368) where the latter also concentrates on Carnap's 
notion o f pure semantics (369, 379f). This is by no means to be 
identified wi th linguistic semantics, as the following characterization 
o f its function shows (380): 
T h e task Carnap assigns to semantics is relatively restricted and well-defined: 
its goal is to define the predicate 'true' for a given object language—that is, to 
assign truth conditions to all the propositions of that language. 
As regards linguistic semantics, we will probably have to distinguish 
furthermore between word semantics (or lexical semantics) and sentence 
semantics, as has become customary since Katz-Fodor's stimulating 
but unsuccessful attempt in 1963 to come to grips with sentence 
meaning. 
I n closing our analysis o f some more central metalinguistic terms let 
us now consider some uses oi transformation and transformational. In 
his dialogue with Parret, Chomsky (36f) distinguishes his use of 
transformation from Harris's view in the following way: while the 
latter's notion 'remained a relation between sentences or sentence 
forms' his own approach was 'developed within an entirely different 
general framework', incorporating the notion o f transformation 
'within the theory o f generative syntax.' This is characterized as 
follows (36): 
7. For a detailed explanation of the view that complex lexical items can be understood as 
topicalized underlying sentences cf. Lipka (1976). 
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T h e phrase structure component specifies a system of abstract forms that are 
mapped into surface structures by grammatical transformations, which are 
operations converting phrase-markers, in essence, labelled trees, into other 
phrase-markers. 
This description creates the impression that Chomsky's own use o f 
transformation has not changed at all since 1957. However, although 
transformations d id in fact relate abstract representations o f sentences 
to each other in Syntactic Structures, these where relatively close to 
surface structure, since the notion o f deep structure had not yet been 
developed. Only once this had been done, could the function o f 
transformation be defined as obligatorily converting deep structures 
into surface structures. The meaning preserving nature o f trans-
formations was furthermore affected by the development from 
Standard Theory to Extended Standard Theory. The effect o f the 
change from 'surface syntax' to 'deep syntax' (in Crystal's terms) on 
the notion o f transformation is referred to explicitly in the interview 
with Lamb (182): 
As far as I know, it was only about 1962 that Chomsky began to recognize 
deep structure as somehow on a different level from surface structure. T h e 
transformations then took on a different aspect. 
McCawley (250) draws attention to the fact that he uses transforma-
tional differently from Lakoff, namely in 'a broader sense which 
covers both what Chomsky does and what generative semanticists 
do'. I f the term transformation is used for denoting very different 
extralinguistic referents, the obvious conclusion to draw is to intro-
duce different terms for different phenomena. This conclusion is 
drawn in Discussing Language by Saumjan (289) who points out that 
transformation in T G : 
and the notion of the transformation rule in applicative grammar are so 
fundamentally different that it seems necessary to introduce a new term for 
the tr&asform&üott rules w\ appik.2to\e grammai. \ n appYicauve grammar 1 
propose to speak of semantic derivation rules instead of transformation rules. 
I n the development o f generative grammar the notion o f transforma-
tion has changed so radically that it does not denote the same 
phenomenon at the different stages o f the development o f the 
theory. I t is therefore misleading, in my opinion, to give a very 
comprehensive definition, as Chomsky does in the book, which 
creates the impression that the underlying theoretical assumptions 
are still the same. But even dur ing a single phase transformation has 
been used to refer to very different entities. However, all o f these 
are theoretical constructs, a fact which has not always been kept in 
mind, and has therefore led to hypostatization (see 3.4.). For 
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example, in Aspects Chomsky uses the collocations elementary trans­
formation and passive transformation side by side, although they denote 
very different operations. Specific transformations that are partly 
language-dependent, such as Passive, the Do-Transformation (both 
in Syntactic Structures), Extraposition, There-Insertion, and Equi-
NP-Deletion are not on the same level as very general, probably 
universal, operations such as deletion, substitution, adjunction and 
permutation (seen as a combination o f more elementary processes). 
Only for the latter Hasegawa (1968:242) proposed to use transforma­
tion, while the other particular processes should be considered 
families o f transformations. Chomsky (1970:203) partly followed 
this proposal in Remarfa on Nominalization, where he considers 'the 
passive operation' as 'an amalgam of two steps' which he called 
Agent-Postponing and NP-Preposing. The use o f a single term, such 
as transformation, for denoting very different phenomena is danger­
ous, in that it creates a false impression o f unity. Furthermore, it 
makes people forget that the notion is a theoretical construct, and 
may lead them to believe that transformations exist independently o f 
theoretical assumptions. This is what I call hypostatization. 
3.3.3. Before we come to a closer examination o f this phenome­
non, let me draw attention to a single instance in Discussing Language, 
where linguistic methods are applied to linguistic terminology, as it 
is advocated here. McCawley (263) points out explicitly that perfor­
mance is not only referentially vague, but also grammatically am­
biguous: 
T h e principal thing that I find wrong with Chomsky's terms 'competence' 
and 'performance' is that he used 'performance' to cover everything other 
than 'competence' . . . Also, 'performance' is grammatically ambiguous 
between an object nominalization (meaning 'what one produces') and an 
action nominalization (meaning 'act of producing' or 'way of producing'), 
and Chomsky uses it in both of those senses. 
Unfortunately, this is the only explicit remark in the book, where 
linguistic analysis is directly applied to the language linguists use. 
3.4. Throughout this review-article I have repeatedly referred to a 
phenomenon called hypostatization. I use this term to denote the 
phenomenon that the existence o f a linguistic sign suggests the 
existence o f a single entity as its referent. As pointed out in Leisi 
(1952; 1975:25f) there is a tendency for all lexical items, whether 
simple or complex, to imply that the entity denoted by a word 
actually exists as a substance or person—something he calls 'Hypo-
stasierung durch das Wort'. Leisi claims that there are different 
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kinds o f hypostatization according to word-class. The hypostatization 
induced by nouns and noun phrases is, in my opinion, a result o f the 
existential presuppositions o f such linguistic expressions. The exis­
tence of a simple or derived noun, (such as transformation), or o f a 
stable collocation (such as deep structure), suggests to the naive hearer 
and speaker that only a single entity, denoted by the term, exists. 
However, as the remark by Martinet quoted above shows, even 
linguists are not immune to this suggestion. I n fact, I believe that the 
hypostatization o f theoretical constructs has played a considerable 
role in recent linguistics. 8 The existence o f terms such as competence, 
generative, presupposition etc. have induced many linguists to forget 
that such terms are dependent on theoretical assumptions and their 
referents do not exist independently as unitary absolute entities. 
The use o f such elements o f the metalanguage is either explicitly 
defined by the linguist, or must be derived from his usage in context. 
Sometimes actual usage and explicit definition are at variance as we 
have seen above in some instances. In order to discover such 
discrepancy the language o f linguists must be carefully analysed with 
linguistic methods, as I have tried to do above. This procedure is 
perfectly in agreement with the re-discovery o f the referential 
function o f language which is stressed both by Parret and 
Bouveresse (386) in the book. The recent development of linguistics 
can therefore bear fruit for the methodology o f linguistics itself. I n 
my opinion, the following remarks by Bouveresse (386) are particu­
larly to the point: 
T h e theory of reference, particularly of comextually determined reference, 
belongs obviously to pragmatics . . . You are completely right when you say 
that it has long been practically impossible to insist on the referential 
properties of language without the risk of being accused of returning to an 
atomistic, pre-scientific, and completely obsolete conception . . . Language 
is also a means to refer to objects and to describe states of affairs. Ί ban k God, 
the disastrous situation to which we have just alluded is changing completely. 
4. A synthesis of recent trends. 
4.1. I f we now attempt a synthesis o f both, Discussing Language and 
the present article, we may say that it is extremely important for 
linguists to reflect on language including their own language. This 
means that they must explicitly discuss the language they describe, 
their scientific object, as well as the language they use, their 
8. Cf. the remark on 'the hypostatization of "conversational postulates" or alternative deep 
structures' in Searle (1975:60). 
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formalization and terminology. For this purpose an awareness o f the 
history o f linguistics is extremely helpful. Recent developments as 
witnessed by Discussing Language can be characterized in the follow­
ing way. Linguistics has gone beyond the sentence, including co-text, 
developing into a linguistics o f discourse or text linguistics. I t has 
also gone beyond sentence meaning, considering such aspects as 
context (of situation) and illocutionary force, thus embracing prag­
matics within its scope. On the whole, linguistics has become more 
inclusive, more open-minded and this extension o f the field particu­
larly concerns the functional aspects o f language. The development 
can perhaps be best summed up in the following words o f 
Bouveresse (386f): 
Ail the phenomena which we have discussed at one time or another—the 
renewal of interest in semantic but also pragmatic research, the need many 
people feel for a linguistics of discourse, and no longer only of the word or the 
sentence, the opening toward other disciplines such as psychology, sociology, 
and ethnology, the attempts to constitute a theory of reference and of 
presupposition in rather close conjunction with logic, etc.—are finally going 
in the same direction. What matters, once more, is to understand language 
no longer by itself, but as a potential of linguistic acts (whereas Chomsky-
understands the possession of language more as a disposal of a potential of 
linguistic characterizations). 
This characterization of ' the state o f art' as documented by Discussing 
Language has to be supplemented by a further striking feature also 
noted by Bouveresse (302): the plurality o f trends. I t is both 
refreshing and a promising sign for its future development that 
linguistics is no longer to be identified with one brand or the other o f 
transformational-generative orthodoxy. 
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